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Abstract 
This paper discusses how Zainichi Koreans developed their identities both within and outside the 
realm of the ethnic community and ethnic organisations. This study uses qualitative multi-
methods research based on interviews with members and non-members of Zainichi Koirean 
organisations and field observations. The examination on Zainichi Koirean organisation members 
mainly concentrates on lived experiences of members from one of the ethnic organisations of 
Zainichi Koreans, Chongryun. This study finds that although some young Koreans separate 
themselves from the organisation and the homeland, they remain in the community. Many 
Chongryun Koreans share a collective ethnic consciousness, which was based on members’ love 
for the Chongryun schools. While there is an internal division within the community in terms of 
political views, many members still have a strong sense of group solidarity. On the other hand, 
the identities of non-member respondents are remarkably diverse. While some of them are 
assimilated into Japanese society, others retain strong ethnic identities. Their identities are less 
affected by any ethnic organisations and they rarely share collective memories with other Zainichi 
Koreans. This study shows that social networks and experiences of ethnic community individuals 
have a key role in determining their identities and the ways in which they live their lives.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores how Zainichi-related organisations and communities have affected the 
formation of their member’s ethnic identities and lives. It mainly focuses on Chongryun, which 
serves as a representative of North Korea in Japan. Chongryun was established by Leftist Zainichi 
Koreans in 1955 and has offered firm loyalty to North Korea; it consists of a complex of numerous 
associations affiliated to the main organisation covering forty-seven prefectures of Japan. The 
way in which the affiliated organisations are arranged is similar to the North Korean (and Soviet) 
style, where the central party operates satellite organisations for women, youth, children and 
occupational groups (Ryang 1997: 3). The first part of this paper provides overviews of the lives 
and activities of Chongryun members within that community. This examination shows how 
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Chongryun started losing its importance in the economic and social lives of its members. 
Consequently, a decline of its membership occurred. The second section explores their shifting 
orientation and the resultant divisions of the Chongryun collective identity. This section analyses 
the shifts in relation to the transitional identity of Zainichi Koreans from the central Chongryun 
organisation to the local Chongryun community-centred Korean schools. Lastly, this paper 
investigates identities of non-Chongryun Zainichi Koreans in comparison to Chongryun Koreans. 
The attitudes and views of non-organisational Koreans towards Zainichi-related organisations and 
their members are examined. In this section, the following key questions are investigated: Do 
non-Chongryun Koreans maintain an ethnic identity? If they do, how do they retain it without 
taking part in organisational activities? What is the difference between their identity and 
Chongryun collective identity?  
 
2. Organisational Backgrounds of Chongryun Respondents 
This study adopts empirical qualitative multi-methods research based on semi-
structured and in-depth interviews and field observations. The fieldwork was conducted for three 
years between 2007 and 2010 in the Kanto Region. The semi-structured/in-depth interviews were 
completed with 36 Zainichi Koreans and a mother of two of the respondents. Out of 37 
interviewees, 23 were members of Zainichi Korean groups. The other 14 Koreans were not 
involved with any Zainichi-related groups. One person out of the 23 group participants took part 
in several non-Chongryun Zainichi-Korean groups. The remaining 22 people belonged to the 
Chongryun organisation or Chongryun-operated groups, although some of them were not very 
active. Of the 22 Chongryun participants, ten were university or technical school students who 
participated in Ryugakudo (Korean Student League in Japan). Three male Koreans in their late 
30s and early 40s belonged to affiliates of Korean Youth Commerce Community (KYC), 
including a leading representative of a regional affiliate of KYC and a former leading 
representative. In addition, four Zainichi Koreans worked for Chongryun full time: two for the 
Chongryun organisation centre, one for Ryugakudo as a leading representative of the committee, 
and one for a Chongryun-affiliated high school as a teacher. Out of 22 Chongryun-related Koreans, 
three Japanese-schooled Koreans had begun participating in Ryugakudo when they reached their 
late teens or early 20s. The remaining 19 participants had family histories of involvement with 
Chongryun over two or three generations.  
Although most first generation Zainichi Koreans were originally from South Korea, an 
overwhelming majority supported North Korea after the war. According to Fukuoka (2004), they 
formed a strong working-class identity through the experience of poverty and racism in Japan. 
They became sympathetic with the workers’ state in the North. Statistics from the 1950s show 
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that only 7.4 percent of the Koreans in Japan were classified as South Korean citizens (Chin 2001: 
62). In fact, the respondents’ first generations also came from southern parts of Korea, such as the 
regions of Kyongsang, Cholla and Cheju. Most Chongryun respondents shared the same view 
regarding the reason why first-generation Zainichi Koreans favoured the North; their 
grandparents had felt abandoned by South Korea. It was North Korea and its leader Kim Il-Sung 
that had assisted them in their hardships and their struggle to preserve ethnic schools in Japan. 
Since its establishment, the largest Zainichi community has been centred around Chongryun. Its 
members have been generally regarded as pro-North Koreans. Their presence is often perceived 
as an unacceptable threat to Japanese society and social order.  
As Rex’s definition of the functions of ethnic associations shows, Chongryun helps 
individuals to overcome social isolation and to deal with moral and social problems (Rex 1997: 
217). It serves as a kind of trade union defending the interests of the organisation’s members. It 
also maintains the group values and beliefs that perpetuate its political ideology (Rex 1997: 217). 
Chongryun has operated organisational units and regional affiliations throughout the country. 
Both Ryugakudo and KYC, for example, are affiliated with Chongryun. Ryugakudo is a student 
association for young Zainichi Korean college, university and technical school students, 
irrespective of their institutions. Meanwhile, KYC mobilises its members to collaborate in pursuit 
of mutual aid and common goals in business. According to respondents, members of KYC were 
overwhelmingly male business people aged from 29 to 41. All three of the KYC members among 
the respondents were male Chongryun-affiliated school graduates. They worked in Zainichi-
particular industries, such as pachinko parlours and an industrial waste plant.  
As Chongryun is a pro-North Korean organisation, the school curriculum offers North 
Korean ideological education. It teaches Zainichi history as part of the ‘revolutionary activities 
of General Kim Il Sung’ (Kim, C. 2004: 5, cited in Lie 2008). 18 respondents had received ethnic 
education for periods from 12 to 16 years at Chongryun-affiliated schools from elementary to 
high school or university level. Four respondents attended such schools for six or nine years until 
they were transferred to Japanese junior high or high schools. Almost all the young interviewees 
who had graduated from Chongryun high schools were in varying degrees involved with 
Chongryun. Most of them participated in Ryugakudo. 
 
3. Chongryun and Community 
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social circle. They conducted significant social interactions only within the local Chongryun 
community. They tended to cut themselves off from ‘outside’ contact except for business and to 
obtain the minimum necessities of life. The adults were largely likely to take up jobs within the 
organisation or in Zainichi-related companies through their ethnic networks. Mothers stayed at 
home to look after children and the elderly, focusing on housework. Their children were also 
restricted; they attended Chongryun-affiliated schools. Some of the Korean cultural 
distinctiveness has been disappearing overtime, for instance, the clothing worn and the speaking 
of Korean at home. Yet Zainichi Koreans have retained their ethnic heritage by preserving some 
Korean traditions, such as eating Korean food, seasonal rituals, and familial and organisational 
gatherings. Contact with Japanese people tends to be limited for some Chongryun Koreans. Even 
though many of them are surrounded by Japanese in their neighbourhoods, they rarely develop 
neighbourly ties with them. Their life dimensions, involving friendship formation, network 
mobilisation, and social interaction, are limited to their community.  
  Those who were geographically isolated from other members have strived to stay in the 
Chongryun community. They send their children to the nearest Chongryun-affiliated schools, 
which are often a long commute for small children, usually taking one to two hours by train. In 
the case of Se-hong (male, age 32), he and his sister were sent to a school in another prefecture 
since there were no Chongryun-affiliated schools nearby. They lived with other Zainichi peers in 
a boarding house away from their parents from the age of six. All the students from elementary 
and junior high boarded at the school dormitory and went home to see their parents only at the 
weekends. After graduating from Chongryun’s Korea University, Se-hong started working in the 
Chongryun organisation. Living only within the Zainichi community, he seldom interacted with 
Japanese and refused to make friends with them. 
Meanwhile, other Chongryun Koreans moved out of the Chongryun circle due to 
marriage or business links to regions with a smaller Korean population and no Chongryun-
affiliated school. This was the case for Toshiaki (male, age 21), Kwang-ho (male, age 25) and 
Chung-ja (female, age 22). After moving to new environments, all of their families alienated 
themselves from Chongryun networks. Their parents began using Japanese names in daily life 
and sent their children to Japanese schools. Subsequently, Kwang-ho and Chung-ja started 
participating in Ryugakudo events as university students, after starting to live on their own in 
Tokyo. Their parents were strongly opposed to their participation in Chongryun activities. 
Chongryun Koreans, who remained in the community, rarely recognised their Zainichi 
community as part of Japanese society. They drew sharp community boundaries. For example, 
Ae-young (female, age 21) described Chongryun-affiliated schools as ‘their own territory.’ They 
did not consider the ‘outside,’ namely Japanese society, a place they belonged to. Similarly, Jung-
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a (female, age 38) did not feel she knew ‘what society was really like’ because she had ‘never 
been outside the Zainichi community.’ The Chongryun community is an independent space that 
gives them comfort and security. This perception of a clear contrast between their own community 
and Japanese society was often seen in the remarks of Chongryun respondents. Their recognition 
of territorial boundaries implies the persistence of ‘ethnic boundary maintenance’ (Barth 1996). 
  Chongryun Koreans would often meet at local Chongryun events. They are usually held 
at local Chongryun-affiliated schools attended by their children. The author observed an athletic 
festival held in the fall of 2008 at a Chongryun-affiliated high school in Tokyo. It seemed that 
hundreds of people, most of whom were obviously families and relatives of the students, knew 
each other. In effect many of them were closely connected, not only as families of the students, 
but as old friends from their school days or, in many cases, their relatives. Many of the ethnic 
school graduates were married to their former classmates or those related to school friends. This 
involves the people in a real family kinship. The big events in Tokyo are usually held at the sole 
Tokyo Chongryun-affiliated high school. Many alumni from this school and their 
multigenerational families enjoyed getting together there. Fieldwork suggested a broad tendency 
among Chongryun Koreans to stay close to each other long after graduation. Most Chongryun 
interviewees agreed this allows them to create a warm and familial atmosphere. This also clearly 
provides the community members with a sense of pride and belonging. 
At Chongryun events, two languages – Korean and Japanese – were switched and 
intermingled depending on the situation within the Chongryun sphere. On the stage or in 
announcements at Chongryun events, people spoke only Korean. Even in casual and off-stage 
settings, some people spoke only in Korean, especially when speaking to elderly people, 
presumably first-generation Koreans. But many people spoke almost entirely in Japanese. During 
conversations they used some conventional expressions in Korean, such as ‘Anyeong Hashimnika’ 
(hello), ‘Omo-nim’ (mother) or ‘Aboji’ (father). It was also common to refer to friends older than 
themselves as their ‘brother’ or ‘sister’ in Korean, and behaved towards each other as such. These 
practices in language usage obviously help strengthen emotional ties to each other as an extension 
of a family, as language may serve as ‘an internal reminder of difference’ (Nash 1996: 26) and 
strengthen ethnic consciousness.  
Chongryun Koreans’ strong communal solidarity was partly a consequence of the 
oppression they experienced and the pressure to assimilate into Japanese society. According to 
Eun-mi (female, age 35), they were constantly compelled to regard Japanese people and the 
society as ‘their enemy whom they have to fight against.’ They occasionally experienced 
oppression from Japan in the forms of North Korea bashing, racial attacks and verbal abuse 
against Korean students, and harassment against Korean schools and Chongryun. Eun-mi recalls 
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witnessing Japanese police barge into her school every time some political problem occurred. As 
a result of incidents such as these, the community members were constantly highly sceptical of 
Japan. As their anger toward the Japanese government and the society built up, their determination 
to hold on to their ethnic bonds grew stronger (Lie 2008: 119).  
The antagonism between the Chongryun community and Japanese society was reflected 
in Chongryun education; Pan-yong (male, age 26) recalled how teachers at Chongryun-affiliated 
schools portrayed Japan as ‘a virtual enemy.’ Many students had a sense of hostility towards 
Japanese students and assimilated Zainichi Koreans. This ‘enemy’ notion is effective in increasing 
the level of group solidarity among students (Ryang 1997: 181). Hence one of the keys to 
understanding their firm unity and the formation of their ethnic identities is the shared sense of 
resistance to subjugation. Their Chongryun identity is, to borrow Castells, based on ‘an oppressed 
identity,’ grown from ‘collective resistance’ (Castells 1997).  
 
3.2. Maintain the Organisation 
Interviews also revealed that the extremely close ties among the Chongryun community 
members also functioned to ensure that members to remain in the community. Nami (female, age 
31) and her family lived in an area with a high population of Chongryun Koreans. Her parents 
were Chongryun members, although they were not very active. Her parents sent her to 
Chongryun-operated schools, not only because they hoped that she would receive ethnic 
education but because there was a great deal of pressure toward her parents from Chongryun over 
their choice of their children’s schools.  
As Nami’s case shows, the organisation has a significant influence on a member’s life 
decisions. If the members or their families choose something that is seen as being against 
Chongryun values and beliefs, they disgrace themselves. For example, when the oldest sister of 
Sun-hi (female, age 19) got married to a Japanese man, her father strongly opposed the marriage. 
Sun-hi’s parents did not attend their wedding, and her father kept his daughter’s marriage entirely 
secret from other Chongryun Koreans. Sun-hi’s father was in a high position within one of the 
units. Out of fear for ‘losing face,’ every effort is made to avoid any individual choices that are 
seen as incompatible with the community’s values. Evidently each member is expected to give 
priority to group values, rather than to personal desires. In so doing, members play the role of 
monitors keeping an eye on each other. This surveillance has especially intensified towards 
Chongryun full-time workers, usually fathers and breadwinners. They often have others intervene 
in their private matters and choices in life. The fathers can be put in difficult positions within the 
organisation depending on their own or their family members’ behaviour. For instance, the father 
of Sang-mi (female, age 39), who had worked in a central position within Chongryun, was ordered 
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by the organisation to send her to their Korea University ‘by any means.’  
Out of those interviewees, three Chongryun full-time workers had fathers who worked 
in central positions within Chongryun. One of these respondents, Chung-ae (female, age 31), 
admitted that an approved plan of her life was already set within the community in terms of choice 
of schools and occupation. Community involvement and commitment among Chongryun 
members is mandatory for the children of the full-time Chongryun workers. These students have 
to serve in Chongryun schools and other offices upon graduating from Chongryun schools or the 
University (Ryang 1997: 38). Their obligation to continue membership in the organisation is 
crucial for Chongryun because, as Hechter argues, a community’s survival is contingent on its 
success in retaining members in succeeding generations (Hechter 1996).  
The hierarchical convention within schools was also pointed out by several respondents. 
It is based on their contributions to the organisation. According to Sang-mi, Sun-hi and Hae-jung 
(female, age 19), their teachers treated students differently depending on their family donations 
and their parents’ positions within the organisation. Sun-hi and Hae-jung also complained that the 
children of Korea University teachers were exempted from tuition fees to Chongryun-affiliated 
schools. At the same time, however, they pitied these children of Chongryun cadres because ‘they 
are not free to have their own opinions.’ They were often elected as class representatives by 
teachers, sometimes against their own will, because their leadership experiences would be 
appreciated in Chongryun. Indeed, some of their friends in this position were barred from 
attending Japanese schools to fulfil a career ambition due to the pressure from the school and their 
parents. Their sympathy towards these students suggests that being Chongryun fulltime workers 
is no longer regarded as an ideal among the community members.  
 
3.3. Leaving Chongryun and North Korea 
While many Chongryun Koreans have left the organisation, some younger generations 
have remained within the Chongryun community. Nevertheless, they have also spoken against 
Chongryun and become doubtful about North Korea’s future (Ryang 2000). Indeed, some 
Chongryun interviewees actively engaged in Chongryun activities, but most of them expressed 
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the organisation. Bong-wa and In-sung (male, age 40) even supported the idea of Korean-Japanese 
in succeeding generations to acquire equal rights with Japanese. For these generations in the 
centre of the unit, retaining either Chōsen or South Korean nationality is no longer an absolute 
requirement for membership. However, this new perspective does not correspond with that of the 
older generations. In this respect, the organisation has failed to meet the demand of younger 
generations and to understand the reality of their individual lives. 
Most Chongryun respondents pointed out the fact that Chongryun has reduced the 
centripetal force of the organisation and its membership has fallen precipitously. This is partly the 
result of distrust towards its top management and towards North Korea among Zainichi Koreans. 
According to In-sung, recently many Koreans have grown tired of the politics and the internal 
conflicts within the organisation. The number of schools has been decreasing accordingly. 
Zainichi Koreans’ distrust towards North Korea was also attributed to the reports on the 
kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea in 2002. Chongryun had reinvented itself to 
better adapt to Japanese society since around 1998 (Chin 2001). However, the abduction issue 
shook the members’ faith in North Korea. Most Chongryun respondents in their late 30s and early 
40s were deeply disturbed by the news and felt betrayed by North Korea. Bong-hwa (male, age 
39) saw numerous Zainichi Koreans naturalise and leave Chongryun altogether. They stopped 
sending their children to ethnic schools. During their interviews, respondents whispered as they 
talked making sure that the people around the table were out of earshot. This indicates how 
sensitive this issue is among Chongryun respondents. Given such conditions, it is unsurprising 
that some Chongryun Koreans have difficulty in maintaining their allegiance to North Korea. 
  Another explanation for the decline of Chongryun is that many Zainichi Koreans are 
now able to make a living without relying on the organisation. According to Chung-ae, the first 
and second generations of Chongryun Koreans engaged in collective actions to improve their 
social situations. Chongryun members made desperate efforts to challenge discrimination through 
various collective movements, i.e. development of Korean ethnic schools and resistance against 
Japanese suppression. As Nathan and Moynihan propose, people are connected to their groups 
not only by ties of family and friendship, but also by ties of interest (Nathan and Moynihan 1996: 
138). The organisation had no difficulty mobilising members when discrimination against them 
in Japanese society was prevalent. However, as visible discrimination lessened and their social 
situations improved, Chongryun became unnecessary for some Koreans. They started prioritising 
their personal lives rather than fulfilling their duties as members.  
A student of Chongryun’s Korea University, Man-su (male, age 22) indicated 
Chongryun Koreans’ vigorous efforts and eventual success in improving their lives had led to the 
decline of Chongryun. For instance, when Japanese universities denied Chongryun students the 
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opportunity to take the entrance examinations, many students went to Korea University, but once 
most Japanese universities began accepting Chongryun students, the number of those enrolling in 
Korea University decreased. Consequently, it became difficult for the university to foster 
Chongryun-affiliated school teachers; they faced a dilemma. Man-su stated: 
 
There used to be a high wall between Japanese society and the Zainichi community 
which Zainichi Koreans couldn’t surmount. Zainichis couldn’t get out of the 
community at that time. For this reason, we were able to build such a cohesive 
community. But now people have scattered and there is more diversity among Zainichi. 
 
According to Man-su, Chongryun has now attempted to meet the new challenge by recruiting 
other Zainichi Koreans. For instance, its student group, Ryugakudo, has sought to enhance ethnic 
ties and patriotism among Zainichi Korean students, both Japanese-schooled and Chongryun-
schooled Koreans. Man-su explained: 
 
Some people don’t have a firm ethnic identity. They hesitate to use a Korean name in 
Japanese society and can’t take pride in being Koreans. They can’t live as Koreans. 
We are trying to help and give them the opportunities to have a solid identity. [...] We 
recruit these people and let them know this kind of community exists.  
 
Man-su’s statement reflects Chongryun’s endeavours to reproduce Chongryun Korean ethnicity 
and gradually change its strategies. Chongryun based uniting people on ‘homeland orientation’ 
(Lie 2008) and shared political purposes and mutual interests since its establishment in 1955. Now 
Chongryun’s urgent task is to encourage Zainichi Koreans to identify themselves with the 
organisation and to mobilise them collectively. To this end, Chongryun groups have sought to 
foster a sense of ethnic identity among Zainichi Koreans, including non-Chongryun members, by 
emphasising emotional dimensions. In the absence of shared political motives, it has strived to 
incorporate Zainichi Koreans of various backgrounds into Chongryun by helping them a search 
for identity. It has aimed to generate a collective identity among the young people by diversifying 
cultural and social experiences. Nevertheless, the steady decline of the organisation, despite this 
effort, shows the limitations of its consciousness-raising method as a strategy.  
 
4. New Collective Identity of Chongryun Koreans 
4.1. Chongryun Identity in Transition 
Although the size of the Chongryun community has continued to shrink, some 
the organisation. Bong-wa and In-sung (male, age 40) even supported the idea of Korean-Japanese 
in succeeding generations to acquire equal rights with Japanese. For these generations in the 
centre of the unit, retaining either Chōsen or South Korean nationality is no longer an absolute 
requirement for membership. However, this new perspective does not correspond with that of the 
older generations. In this respect, the organisation has failed to meet the demand of younger 
generations and to understand the reality of their individual lives. 
Most Chongryun respondents pointed out the fact that Chongryun has reduced the 
centripetal force of the organisation and its membership has fallen precipitously. This is partly the 
result of distrust towards its top management and towards North Korea among Zainichi Koreans. 
According to In-sung, recently many Koreans have grown tired of the politics and the internal 
conflicts within the organisation. The number of schools has been decreasing accordingly. 
Zainichi Koreans’ distrust towards North Korea was also attributed to the reports on the 
kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea in 2002. Chongryun had reinvented itself to 
better adapt to Japanese society since around 1998 (Chin 2001). However, the abduction issue 
shook the members’ faith in North Korea. Most Chongryun respondents in their late 30s and early 
40s were deeply disturbed by the news and felt betrayed by North Korea. Bong-hwa (male, age 
39) saw numerous Zainichi Koreans naturalise and leave Chongryun altogether. They stopped 
sending their children to ethnic schools. During their interviews, respondents whispered as they 
talked making sure that the people around the table were out of earshot. This indicates how 
sensitive this issue is among Chongryun respondents. Given such conditions, it is unsurprising 
that some Chongryun Koreans have difficulty in maintaining their allegiance to North Korea. 
  Another explanation for the decline of Chongryun is that many Zainichi Koreans are 
now able to make a living without relying on the organisation. According to Chung-ae, the first 
and second generations of Chongryun Koreans engaged in collective actions to improve their 
social situations. Chongryun members made desperate efforts to challenge discrimination through 
various collective movements, i.e. development of Korean ethnic schools and resistance against 
Japanese suppression. As Nathan and Moynihan propose, people are connected to their groups 
not only by ties of family and friendship, but also by ties of interest (Nathan and Moynihan 1996: 
138). The organisation had no difficulty mobilising members when discrimination against them 
in Japanese society was prevalent. However, as visible discrimination lessened and their social 
situations improved, Chongryun became unnecessary for some Koreans. They started prioritising 
their personal lives rather than fulfilling their duties as members.  
A student of Chongryun’s Korea University, Man-su (male, age 22) indicated 
Chongryun Koreans’ vigorous efforts and eventual success in improving their lives had led to the 
decline of Chongryun. For instance, when Japanese universities denied Chongryun students the 
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Chongryun Koreans choose to stay in their local Chongryun community. In-sung (male, age 40) 
reported that many people no longer attended events organised by the central organisation, but 
they participated in local Chongryun events in their hometowns. These people still place 
importance on their Korean ethnicity and have a strong sense of loyalty to the local community, 
even though they are not fully supportive of the North or Chongryun.  
The resistance to identification with Chongryun and North Korea was often seen in the 
respondents’ narratives. Some Chongryun Korean interviewees claimed to be different from those 
deeply committed and attached to North Korea by calling them red (from the red colour 
representing Communism and North Korea) or ‘baribari’ (a casual term to mean ‘hard core’). 
Chongryun people often teased each other by calling him/her ‘red,’ even though the users had no 
intention to humiliate or be spiteful toward them. This is a common expression among Chongryun 
Koreans, containing the nuance of mocking loyal followers of North Korea. According to Sun-hi, 
there were only a few ‘red’ people at school who idealised and rationalised the North and 
Chongryun. She claimed her parents were not ‘red’ at all either, even though they opposed her 
sister’s marriage to a Japanese man. Her statement revealed a sense of apathy and irritation 
towards the North and Chongryun; it also implied her hope to distance herself and those around 
her from them. These young people no longer have shared collective memories or political 
ideologies with either their homeland or the leadership of Chongryun.  
 
4.2. Love for Schools 
Some parents have also been critical of Chongryun-affiliated schools and the North, 
especially since the abduction issue was revealed. In addition, Chongryun schools and parents 
began to receive anonymous phone calls threatening to kidnap, hurt and kill their children (Ryang 
2005: 235). Consequently, the number of parents sending their children to ethnic schools has been 
decreasing. The parents of Gyong-si (male, age 21) and Min-ho (male, age 21) hoped their sons 
would go on to attend Japanese high schools after the ethnic junior high school and opposed their 
active participation in Chongryun youth groups.  
Irrespective of this, several Chongryun respondents had strong emotional bonds of love 
for Chongryun-affiliated schools. Preservation of these schools is one of the primary goals for 
their activities in Chongryun. Even those showing the least emotional attachment to the North and 
Chongryun, such as Sun-hi and Hae-jung, had made their best friends at these schools and had a 
strong desire for them to be preserved. They also confirmed that they would send their children 
to Chongryun-affiliated schools in the future. Many younger Chongryun Koreans separated 
themselves from both Chongryun and North Korea, yet they still identified themselves with the 
Korean community in Japan and had pride in being Zainichi Korean. The schools are now the 
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centre for local Chongryun activities. This suggests that their loyalties and attachment have been 
localised and their local schools have become the motivating force for individual members.  
In 1957 the North Korean government began sending education funds to Chongryun, 
but it stopped in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Ryang 2005: 226). Since then, the schools 
have been preserved and mostly funded by parents, alumni, wealthy donors and the community. 
According to In-sung (male, age 40), the majority of KYC members in his region were graduates 
of Chongryun schools, and they regularly organised events to collect donations for the schools. 
Bong-hwa (male, age 39) continued to pay an annual membership fee to Chongryun, donate 
money, and help with fund-raising events only because he hoped to preserve the schools. Likewise, 
In-sung served as the representative of a KYC regional office for the same reason. According to 
him, many Koreans meet at schools when Chongryun affiliates hold events, such as barbecue 
parties, athletic festivals, and charity events there. To quote In-sung: 
 
There is still discrimination against us in society. But people including the elders can 
get together and enjoy companionship with their comrades at these schools. […] The 
only thing we always agree on at meetings of KYC is that we must preserve schools at 
the very least.  
 
In-sung not only sent his children to Chongryun-affiliated schools but also paid the tuition for all 
the six children of his Chongryun employees, who had been his seniors at school. He did not want 
them to put their children in to Japanese schools for financial reasons while working for his 
company. This reflects the strong ties and connections among Chongryun-affiliated school 
graduates as well as an eagerness to preserve ethnic schools. It seemed their relationships went 
beyond the usual ones between an employer and employees, and their connection was as strong 
as that of a family. Within this close relationship, In-sung’s employees may have had no choice 
but to send their children to Chongryun-affiliated schools, even though they may have secretly 
desired to enrol them in Japanese schools. The ethnicity of these Chongryun Koreans is 
constructed in the regularities of obligations and social bonds and in the extensions of kinship 
(Fenton 1999: 25).  
Moreover In-sung’s account suggests that Chongryun-affiliated schools are not only for 
attendant students, but also for Chongryun Koreans of all ages and generations. They get together 
and meet their comrades at school. Additionally, some school graduates often displayed a great 
feeling of gratitude to the first generation for their strenuous effort in having built up the ethnic 
schools. For the younger generations, their determination and endeavour to preserve schools is a 
manifestation of their allegiance to the first generation. Passion for the schools binds together all, 
Chongryun Koreans choose to stay in their local Chongryun community. In-sung (male, age 40) 
reported that many people no longer attended events organised by the central organisation, but 
they participated in local Chongryun events in their hometowns. These people still place 
importance on their Korean ethnicity and have a strong sense of loyalty to the local community, 
even though they are not fully supportive of the North or Chongryun.  
The resistance to identification with Chongryun and North Korea was often seen in the 
respondents’ narratives. Some Chongryun Korean interviewees claimed to be different from those 
deeply committed and attached to North Korea by calling them red (from the red colour 
representing Communism and North Korea) or ‘baribari’ (a casual term to mean ‘hard core’). 
Chongryun people often teased each other by calling him/her ‘red,’ even though the users had no 
intention to humiliate or be spiteful toward them. This is a common expression among Chongryun 
Koreans, containing the nuance of mocking loyal followers of North Korea. According to Sun-hi, 
there were only a few ‘red’ people at school who idealised and rationalised the North and 
Chongryun. She claimed her parents were not ‘red’ at all either, even though they opposed her 
sister’s marriage to a Japanese man. Her statement revealed a sense of apathy and irritation 
towards the North and Chongryun; it also implied her hope to distance herself and those around 
her from them. These young people no longer have shared collective memories or political 
ideologies with either their homeland or the leadership of Chongryun.  
 
4.2. Love for Schools 
Some parents have also been critical of Chongryun-affiliated schools and the North, 
especially since the abduction issue was revealed. In addition, Chongryun schools and parents 
began to receive anonymous phone calls threatening to kidnap, hurt and kill their children (Ryang 
2005: 235). Consequently, the number of parents sending their children to ethnic schools has been 
decreasing. The parents of Gyong-si (male, age 21) and Min-ho (male, age 21) hoped their sons 
would go on to attend Japanese high schools after the ethnic junior high school and opposed their 
active participation in Chongryun youth groups.  
Irrespective of this, several Chongryun respondents had strong emotional bonds of love 
for Chongryun-affiliated schools. Preservation of these schools is one of the primary goals for 
their activities in Chongryun. Even those showing the least emotional attachment to the North and 
Chongryun, such as Sun-hi and Hae-jung, had made their best friends at these schools and had a 
strong desire for them to be preserved. They also confirmed that they would send their children 
to Chongryun-affiliated schools in the future. Many younger Chongryun Koreans separated 
themselves from both Chongryun and North Korea, yet they still identified themselves with the 
Korean community in Japan and had pride in being Zainichi Korean. The schools are now the 
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from young to old. In this context, they have retained a firm unity based on the schools that 
transcends time and space. A love for these schools has become a significant vehicle for collective 
mobilisation and maintenance of their community structure at the same time.  
For Chongryun Koreans, attending the schools is believed to be fundamental in gaining 
Korean ethnic identity. Another KYC member, Dak-ho (male, age 41) first hesitated in sending 
his children to a Chongryun-affiliated school out of concern for their future in Japan. Nevertheless, 
he eventually enrolled his children into the ethnic school and did not regret his decision. He 
predicted his grandchildren’s generations and succeeding generations would become more 
Japanised, and this was inevitable. But at the same time he believed the destiny of the ethnic 
identity and the community of Zainichi Koreans depended on the survival of the school and its 
ethnic education.  
The hope for the preservation of the schools was shared by most Zainichi Koreans in 
the Chongryun community, even among those who were discontented with some parts of the 
‘exclusive’ ethnic education of the schools. Chongryun-affiliated schools play the most crucial 
role for community members to retain their ethnic identity and sustain group solidarity. Their 
schools are one of the most important geographical spaces as ‘a reference point for establishing 
the boundaries of an ethnic community’ (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, and Tambini 2002: 54).  
 
5. Non-Chongryun Members 
5.1. Ethnic Consciousness 
Out of the 15 respondents who were not affiliated with Chongryun, Kana (female, age 
22) was the only interviewee who participated in non-Chongryun groups. She contacted these 
groups on the internet. Kana had kept her ethnic heritage hidden from her Japanese friends until 
recently, even after spending one year in South Korea to master the language. Her aim in joining 
the Zainichi groups was to meet other Zainichi Koreans from her own generation. Kana’s 
encounters with other Zainichi Koreans changed her views about Zainichi issues and her own 
identity. Despite of this, Kana was not able to decide which group to stay in because she was ‘still 
wondering how to live [her] life.’ Her hesitation to choose which group she would belong to 
suggests that each Zainichi group has certain cultural values, moral qualities, behaviours, and 
expectations about what Zainichi Koreans should be. That is to say, the ethnic organisations affect 
the core of members’ lifestyles and identities, as they offer individuals beliefs about themselves, 
namely, identity options or ideas about who they are (Rex 1997: 217). 
  Kana also pointed out the difficulty of attracting Zainichi Koreans with names that allow 
them to ‘pass’ as Japanese to Zainichi groups. According to Kana, they were divided into two 
groups: those who yearn for contact with other Zainichi Koreans and those who never wanted to 
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associate with them. People who participate in their events voluntarily are declining in numbers. 
She also stressed the difficulty for those Koreans distant from Korean networks to maintain their 
ethnic identity. Kana said:  
 
There’s no doubt that we’re easily overwhelmed by circumstances while living here. It 
would surely be easy to live without thinking about anything. But the people who find 
this way of thinking wrong join the activities of groups such as Mindan and Chongryun.  
 
In the quote above, she also indicated that Japanese society makes those with Japanese names 
more susceptible to assimilation. It suggests that participation in Zainichi Korean groups is one 
of the keys to maintaining or discovering ethnic identity. 
On the other hand, the remaining 14 respondents were not involved with any Zainichi-
related groups or activities. Four of them received ethnic education from Chongryun-affiliated 
schools for some years but subsequently became estranged from the Chongryun social circle. 
Three were brought up as Japanese with Japanese names and had no strong Korean networks. One 
was a native South Korean and the mother of two of the respondents. One participated in the 
activities of a non-Chongryun Zainichi group several times but stopped taking part in it. Another 
one was sometimes taken to Chongryun-related gatherings by her mother and her Chongryun 
relatives but she was not a member of the group herself. The remaining two were sisters and 
attended Mindan events with their families several times. Yet neither of them belonged to a 
particular group.  
Several respondents, who were isolated from Zainichi networks, were still aware of their 
ethnicity in varying degrees. There were some common features for maintaining their Korean 
ethnicity. Parents and certain circumstances made these individuals conscious of being Korean 
and different from the Japanese around them since childhood. Yeun-ja (female, age 25), for 
example, had only a Korean name and had a strong consciousness of being a foreigner and Korean. 
Her parents had used passing names but started using Korean names upon joining a Zainichi 
Korean group at the age of 20. They gave their children only Korean names and brought them up 
as Koreans. Her parents had stressed that she was South Korean and different from her Japanese 
friends. Yuri (female, age 22) and Miri (female, age 19) were brought up by a second-generation 
father and a South Korean mother; they only used their Korean names. Their parents taught them 
Korean language at home to ensure that they could communicate with their South Korean relatives. 
  What is significant here is that both their second-generation parents had lived as 
Japanese in their youth, using Japanese names and attending Japanese schools. Upon reaching 
adulthood, they started using Korean names and exhibiting Korean ethnicity. Comparing her 
from young to old. In this context, they have retained a firm unity based on the schools that 
transcends time and space. A love for these schools has become a significant vehicle for collective 
mobilisation and maintenance of their community structure at the same time.  
For Chongryun Koreans, attending the schools is believed to be fundamental in gaining 
Korean ethnic identity. Another KYC member, Dak-ho (male, age 41) first hesitated in sending 
his children to a Chongryun-affiliated school out of concern for their future in Japan. Nevertheless, 
he eventually enrolled his children into the ethnic school and did not regret his decision. He 
predicted his grandchildren’s generations and succeeding generations would become more 
Japanised, and this was inevitable. But at the same time he believed the destiny of the ethnic 
identity and the community of Zainichi Koreans depended on the survival of the school and its 
ethnic education.  
The hope for the preservation of the schools was shared by most Zainichi Koreans in 
the Chongryun community, even among those who were discontented with some parts of the 
‘exclusive’ ethnic education of the schools. Chongryun-affiliated schools play the most crucial 
role for community members to retain their ethnic identity and sustain group solidarity. Their 
schools are one of the most important geographical spaces as ‘a reference point for establishing 
the boundaries of an ethnic community’ (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, and Tambini 2002: 54).  
 
5. Non-Chongryun Members 
5.1. Ethnic Consciousness 
Out of the 15 respondents who were not affiliated with Chongryun, Kana (female, age 
22) was the only interviewee who participated in non-Chongryun groups. She contacted these 
groups on the internet. Kana had kept her ethnic heritage hidden from her Japanese friends until 
recently, even after spending one year in South Korea to master the language. Her aim in joining 
the Zainichi groups was to meet other Zainichi Koreans from her own generation. Kana’s 
encounters with other Zainichi Koreans changed her views about Zainichi issues and her own 
identity. Despite of this, Kana was not able to decide which group to stay in because she was ‘still 
wondering how to live [her] life.’ Her hesitation to choose which group she would belong to 
suggests that each Zainichi group has certain cultural values, moral qualities, behaviours, and 
expectations about what Zainichi Koreans should be. That is to say, the ethnic organisations affect 
the core of members’ lifestyles and identities, as they offer individuals beliefs about themselves, 
namely, identity options or ideas about who they are (Rex 1997: 217). 
  Kana also pointed out the difficulty of attracting Zainichi Koreans with names that allow 
them to ‘pass’ as Japanese to Zainichi groups. According to Kana, they were divided into two 
groups: those who yearn for contact with other Zainichi Koreans and those who never wanted to 
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father’s generation with hers, Miri felt that her father’s generation had a much stronger identity 
as Zainichi Koreans because ‘they had to hide it constantly.’ They were delighted when they could 
show their Korean ethnicity and ethnic pride. In sharp contrast, Miri herself likely took being 
Korean for granted because she ‘was brought up as such.’ She also lacked the experiences which 
made her feel so proud of being Korean. Therefore, whereas Miri’s father acquired his ethnic 
identity by overcoming numerous obstacles and adversities, for Miri, living as a Korean was 
perceived as a normal path of life. As is the case with Miri’s father, Yeun-ja’s parents also had 
previously kept their ethnic backgrounds hidden, but subsequently began asserting Korean 
ethnicity.  
For both analytic and presentation purposes, within the context of this research, Miri’s 
and Yeun-ja’s parents’ type of ethnicity is defined as an acquired ethnicity. As De Vos emphasises 
(2006), those who sought and failed to assimilate into the mainstream of society have two 
alternatives: to accept inferior status as their collective self-definition, or to deliberately redefine 
themselves symbolically. The latter option helps them to create a positive view of themselves 
based on cultural and racial (ethnic) distinctions and establishing a sense of collective identity 
(De Vos 2006: 5). Their parents’ ethnicity was acquired through the latter process. Due to 
discrimination and prejudice in mainstream society, their hidden Korean identity had long been 
stigmatised. However, after many years of passing as Japanese, they were determined to redefine 
themselves as Koreans. Alienating experiences of racism encouraged them to gain strong 
oppositional ethnic self-definition (Song 2003: 55). This acquired ethnicity is developed and 
pursued through their willpower and convictions to reverse negative representations of 
themselves and to obtain ethnic pride; it is not automatic but consciously gained through effort, 
training and learning to be Korean. Using ethnic names and learning Korean history and language 
are fundamental ways to accomplish this. Voluntarily adopting this new ethnic identity enables 
them to gain the strong motivation and subjectivity to lead a Zainichi Korean life, and to deny the 
stigmatised self.  
A second-generation Zainichi Korean, Kim Keung-duk, who became the first lawyer 
with foreigner nationality in Japan, obtained Korean ethnicity through this acquired ethnicity 
process. Kim highlights the need for Zainichi Koreans to regain their Korean selves by acquiring 
ethnic elements through learning language, history, and culture (Kim, K. 1995: 28). He 
emphasises the importance for them to extricate themselves from the sense of inferiority that was 
imposed by Japanese society, and to attempt to change the social structure. This type of ethnicity 
was also shared by several Japanese-schooled interviewees who had declared that they would live 
as Koreans after years of passing. For them, ethnicity has been salient in their lives. 
On the other hand, the ethnicity of their children, such as Miri, Yeun-ja and many 
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Chongryun-affiliated school graduates, is defined as a born-into type of ethnicity. The 
aforementioned Kim earnestly provided his children with an ethnic education at home; he wanted 
them not to have an inferiority complex as Koreans and to acquire their ethnic identity naturally 
(Kim, K. 2006: 13). In contrast to their parents like Kim, Miri, Yeun-ja and Chongryun Koreans 
gained an ethnic consciousness effortlessly during the childhood from the surrounding ethnic 
elements, including their parents’ or ethnic schools’ Korean education. Thus the individual sense 
of ethnic membership was internalised during early primary socialisation (Jenkins 2008: 49). 
They retain their ethnicity almost unconsciously and a sense of ‘being Koreans’ or ‘not being 
Japanese’ is taken for granted. This ethnicity gives people an ingrained ethnic consciousness with 
objective and subjective certainty, and it tends to become the core and permanent identity.  
  Another factor for non-participants maintaining Korean ethnicity is that one of their 
parents is a native South Korean. Eun-hee (female, age 56), a South Korean mother, made her 
daughters use Japanese names at nursery school because she assumed that Japanese people would 
have difficulty pronouncing Korean names. Nevertheless, she switched them to Korean names 
shortly afterwards, because Eun-hee spoke Japanese with a Korean accent, nobody would mistake 
her for Japanese, even if she and her children used Japanese names. As obvious foreigners, their 
families could not hide their ethnic background. Consequently, they were always made aware of 
their difference in ethnicity from the Japanese in their daily lives. This suggests that their ethnic 
identity was created ‘in the meeting of internal and external definition’ (Jenkins 2008: 55).  
 
5.2. Attitudes toward Zainichi Groups and Members 
Interviews with non-Chongryun respondents present a clear picture of their attitudes 
toward and views about Zainichi Koreans groups and their members. The research can also 
account for reasons why they did not seek out encounters with other Zainichi Koreans. Out of 15 
non-Chongryun respondents, four received ethnic education from Chongryun-affiliated school for 
the period of six to 12 years. Their Korean identities remained relatively firm and long-lasting 
even after they had become estranged from the community. In fact, except for Nami (female, age 
31), all participants kept using their Korean names within Japanese society. Compared to the 
Chongryun participants, the common feature of these four people was their emphasis on their 
pursuit for personal meaning in their lives, rather than a sense of group affiliation. They developed 
their individuality and focused on their personal lives. Indeed, they did not assume or share a 
sense of responsibility to ‘preserve their schools,’ as did Chongryun members.  
When asked about the difference between her parents’ generation (second generation) 
and her generation (third generation), Eun-a (female, age 35) described her generation as being 
‘less passionate.’ The people in her parents’ generation helped each other because they were 
father’s generation with hers, Miri felt that her father’s generation had a much stronger identity 
as Zainichi Koreans because ‘they had to hide it constantly.’ They were delighted when they could 
show their Korean ethnicity and ethnic pride. In sharp contrast, Miri herself likely took being 
Korean for granted because she ‘was brought up as such.’ She also lacked the experiences which 
made her feel so proud of being Korean. Therefore, whereas Miri’s father acquired his ethnic 
identity by overcoming numerous obstacles and adversities, for Miri, living as a Korean was 
perceived as a normal path of life. As is the case with Miri’s father, Yeun-ja’s parents also had 
previously kept their ethnic backgrounds hidden, but subsequently began asserting Korean 
ethnicity.  
For both analytic and presentation purposes, within the context of this research, Miri’s 
and Yeun-ja’s parents’ type of ethnicity is defined as an acquired ethnicity. As De Vos emphasises 
(2006), those who sought and failed to assimilate into the mainstream of society have two 
alternatives: to accept inferior status as their collective self-definition, or to deliberately redefine 
themselves symbolically. The latter option helps them to create a positive view of themselves 
based on cultural and racial (ethnic) distinctions and establishing a sense of collective identity 
(De Vos 2006: 5). Their parents’ ethnicity was acquired through the latter process. Due to 
discrimination and prejudice in mainstream society, their hidden Korean identity had long been 
stigmatised. However, after many years of passing as Japanese, they were determined to redefine 
themselves as Koreans. Alienating experiences of racism encouraged them to gain strong 
oppositional ethnic self-definition (Song 2003: 55). This acquired ethnicity is developed and 
pursued through their willpower and convictions to reverse negative representations of 
themselves and to obtain ethnic pride; it is not automatic but consciously gained through effort, 
training and learning to be Korean. Using ethnic names and learning Korean history and language 
are fundamental ways to accomplish this. Voluntarily adopting this new ethnic identity enables 
them to gain the strong motivation and subjectivity to lead a Zainichi Korean life, and to deny the 
stigmatised self.  
A second-generation Zainichi Korean, Kim Keung-duk, who became the first lawyer 
with foreigner nationality in Japan, obtained Korean ethnicity through this acquired ethnicity 
process. Kim highlights the need for Zainichi Koreans to regain their Korean selves by acquiring 
ethnic elements through learning language, history, and culture (Kim, K. 1995: 28). He 
emphasises the importance for them to extricate themselves from the sense of inferiority that was 
imposed by Japanese society, and to attempt to change the social structure. This type of ethnicity 
was also shared by several Japanese-schooled interviewees who had declared that they would live 
as Koreans after years of passing. For them, ethnicity has been salient in their lives. 
On the other hand, the ethnicity of their children, such as Miri, Yeun-ja and many 
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Zainichi, and their feeling of camaraderie was much stronger. She contrasted this with the younger 
people who like her built human relationships ‘in a calmer manner,’ regardless of the other 
person’s Zainichi background, or lack thereof. Compared to the older generations, they seemed 
to have more freedom in their lifestyles and friendship choices. Their ethnic identities tend to be 
free from the traditional community structure. This indicates that the collective sense of ethnicity 
has ceased to be salient. They can attend to the past with less emotional risk than their 
grandparents’ and parents’ generations (Gans 1996: 148). Consequently, they have developed 
multi-faceted identities, although their Korean ethnicity still tends to remain core to their identity.  
Some other non-participants were not enthusiastic about meeting other Zainichi Koreans 
partly because of their negative image of Zainichi Koreans in general. Hence they rarely identified 
themselves with Zainichi Koreans and hardly referred to themselves as Zainichi. A naturalised 
respondent, Chie (female, age 22) never described herself as Zainichi, but rather as Japanese or 
sometimes as South Korean during the interview. She showed her repulsion towards Zainichi and 
criticised their activities. She claimed that Zainichi people ‘should become Japanese if they 
continue living in Japan.’ She also argued ‘Japan does not need to establish rights for them.’ Chie 
said:  
 
If they don’t like Japan, they should just go back to their own country. To me, it is just 
reasonable that we [or they] become Japanese nationals [by naturalisation]. I don’t 
understand why they are screaming and yelling so much all the time.  
 
Surprisingly her statement on non-naturalised Zainichi Koreans coincided with the typical 
expressions of some Japanese. They often post messages like ‘if you don’t like Japan, go home’ 
on the internet when criticising and harassing Zainichi Koreans. A similar opinion was given by 
another naturalised respondent, Chang-sook (female, age 33). As her second-generation father did 
not trust in ‘any nation or any organisation,’ Chang-sook never interacted with other Zainichi 
Koreans. She never wanted to encounter them either in person or on the internet and bitterly 
criticised ‘Zainichi people.’ Chang-sook said: 
 
I don’t like the expression ‘Zainichi.’ They are like, ‘we are being discriminated 
against!’ They flock together and can’t do anything without relying on groups. […] 
When I read books on Zainichi, I notice that they cannot get over a strong sense of 
victimisation. They began from it and cannot overcome it. […] They just go around 
and around in the same place down there. Japanese feel sorry for them but just look at 
them from outside.  
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 What was significant was that those who commented unfavourably on ‘Zainichi’ had never been 
overtly discriminated against in Japanese society, but their parents had. These respondents were 
naturalised and thus retain equal rights with native Japanese. Therefore, there was no necessity 
for them to resist oppression and prejudice by ‘sticking together.’ They felt that organisation 
participants were grumbling for no reason, and they could not sympathise with ‘Zainichi Koreans’ 
let alone retain a collective identity as Zainichi Koreans. According to Goldberg and Solomos 
(2002), collective identity is established based on the process of memory, and recollection of a 
common past allows a group to recognise itself as distinctive. A lack of common memory between 
these naturalised people and non-naturalised Zainichi Koreans and discontinuity of their 
experiences as Zainichi Koreans resulted in their refusal to be categorised and bundled into the 
‘Zainichi’ group. 
Some other respondents previously had connections with certain Korean networks but 
had decided not to interact with them. A naturalised respondent, Aki (female, age 38) used to be 
a member of a Mindan regional group in her neighbourhood, although she never engaged in its 
activities. She complained that Mindan had taken advantage of its status in Japan, charging its 
members an excessive fee for granting passports or documents to be sent from South Korea. After 
naturalising, she was never involved with the organisation. According to her, once a member 
became naturalised, Mindan would remove his/her name from the list and have nothing to do with 
him/her. That is to say, naturalisation is one of the definitive boundaries of exclusion from the 
membership of Mindan, which functions as a ‘governmental agency’ (Lie 2008: 70).  
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their seven or eight children working as a street peddler. They always suffered destitution and 
discrimination, as there was nobody and no organisation to help them. Even after he had children 
and established his own trading business dealing with South Koreans, his memory about the 
hardships and his distrust in any nation or any Zainichi group were not effaced. Accordingly, he 
kept telling his children they were not ordinary Japanese, and they would be discriminated against. 
He sent his daughters to Christian girl schools to protect them from possible bullying, and made 
them study hard, saying, ‘if you can’t get a respectable job, Japan will forsake you.’ As a result, 
although Chang-sook herself never faced discrimination, she felt she ‘took over the discrimination 
he experienced.’ To quote Chang-sook: 
 
I read some books [on Zainichi] but I couldn’t empathise with them. For I’ve never 
faced any form of discrimination, there was no reality in them for me. I thought they 
were different from me. But there was a reality in what my father said. I didn’t 
experience it, but there was a reality. […] The issue about us being Zainichi is actually 
a family issue for us, not ‘a Zainichi issue.’  
 
Some of their core problems were derived from their being born into Zainichi families. 
Nevertheless, their attention was not directed towards political and postcolonial perspectives, 
which Zainichi-related groups usually emphasised to some degree. They seldom condemned 
Japan for its colonial history and the resultant current situations; they rarely made connections 
between their personal/family problems and the effect of Japan’s imperialism. As there are no 
mutual interests shared with the participants of ethnic organisations, these non-participants’ 
ethnicity is not a ‘political phenomenon’ (Cohen 1996: 84). It is primarily a primordial sense of 
belonging to their ancestry and origin (De Vos 2006: 15). For this reason, their Zainichi issues 
and identities did not go beyond the realm of family life. This should explain why they rarely 
associated with other Koreans let alone experience a sense of group affiliation.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper explored how the organisation and the community of Chongryun affected the 
lives and identities of their membership. While Chongryun full-time employees and members are 
still largely affected by its hegemonic control, other Chongryun people have become more 
independent from the organisation. This indicates that they no longer have shared collective 
memories or political ideologies either with their homeland or with the leadership of Chongryun. 
Nevertheless, many Chongryun Koreans still share the collective identities based on their love for 
the schools. Whether they graduated from Chongryun-affiliated schools or not is one of the clear 
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ethnic boundaries that separates their comrades from others. On the other hand, the identities and 
lives of non-Chongryun member respondents are diversified and differentiated from those of 
Chongryun Koreans. Whilst some were highly assimilated into mainstream Japanese society, 
others maintained individual ethnic identities. They refused to be categorised and bundled into 
‘the Zainichi’ group. Their personal/family problems deriving from their Zainichi Korean 
background and Japanese colonialism rarely extended beyond the realm of their family issues. 
This study shows that social networks and experiences of ethnic community individuals have a 
key role in determining their identities and the ways in which they live their lives. 
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